对谷歌的封锁解除 - 这是一个错误还是测试?

昨日对Google网站进行DNS污染的举措似乎已经解除。封锁的解除应该发生在今天早晨。 因为DNS的机制, 这需要一定时间才能传播到本地ISP的DNS服务器和用户计算机,因此如果你还是不能在中国访问Google,这应该只是时间问题。你可以试图刷新DNS缓存,之后应该就能访问Google了.

虽然对Google的封锁只进行了12小时, 这应该是中国防火长城决策中对用户影响最广的一个. 到底发生了什么? 以下是一些推测:

1. 这是一个错误么?

对全球第一的搜索引擎 (中国第二) 进行封锁发生在周五晚上。 这个可能是某人不小心按错了按钮, 对错误的域名进行了DNS污染. 他们可能只想封锁 mail.google.com. 如果这是一个错误, 这可能能解释为什么封锁在今早解除了. 这样的话, 至少有一个中国国家防火墙的雇员会被解雇. 但是, 我们有一个理由相信这不是一个错误. 中国政府不仅封锁了 google.com 和其子域名 (比如 mail.google.com, play.google.com, maps.google.com 等),他们还DNS污染了 google.com.hk 和 google-analytics.com. 这不可能是一个错误导致的 - 他们必须添加3个封锁规则. 如果这不是因为错误导致, 这次对Google封锁还可能因为什么?

2. 这是中国政府在测试人民的反应么?

我们之前讨论过中国政府没有对Gmail进行封锁只是因为他们害怕民众对全面封锁Gmail的反应. 但是,他们曾使其访问速度缓慢,不稳定. 在2011年3月, 他们似乎准备全面封锁Gmail,但最终没有这样做. 这次迅速解除对Google的封锁是在在测试人民的反应么?你可以在这里浏览新浪用户对此的反应. 显然,公众对不能访问Google,Gmail表示不满。 许多用户将此归咎于正在进行的全国代表大会.可能中国政府也了解到人们的反应,知道了人们对此决定深感不满?

令人感兴趣的是, 新浪微博没有对搜索关键词"Google"或者“谷歌”进行限制. 而且,他们似乎也没有, 删除最近Google的微博。 这可能是故意的, 因为他们也想观测用户的反应. 可能现在他们具体了解了公众对无法访问Google的反应,并且能作出在未来是否永久封锁Google的决定.

3. 只是中国政府测试"封锁Google"按钮么?

还有一种可能性是中国政府在测试“封锁Google”按钮. 中国政府可能想知道, 如果他们某日决定封锁Google, 他们能立马对其进行完全的封锁么.如果这真的是一个封锁测试, 时间上是恰当的(星期五晚上, 国际金融市场关闭).

无论如何, 现在的情形怎么样?

无论你对过去24小时有怎样的看法, 我们似乎回到了原点. 换句话说, Google没有被完全封锁, 但许多Google服务被单独的审查, 从完全封锁到部分封锁. 特别注意的是, Gmail非常不稳定, 这可能是因为,一个或多个IP地址被封锁.

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星期二, 3月 31, 2015

Chinese authorities compromise millions in cyberattacks

The Great Firewall has switched from being a passive, inbound filter to being an active and aggressive outbound one. This is a frightening development and the implications of this action extend beyond control of information on the internet. In one quick movement, the authorities have shifted from enforcing strict censorship in China to enforcing Chinese censorship on internet users worldwide.

星期五, 3月 27, 2015

CNNIC censored Google and Mozilla’s posts about CNNIC CA

This week, Google found unauthorized digital certificates for several Google domains, the root CA of which is CNNIC. Google and Mozilla both publicly disclosed this security incident and published blog posts(Google, Mozilla). However, Chinese translations of Google’s and Mozilla's blog posts were censored on the Chinese Internet.

  • William Long is a prominent Chinese blogger on IT and tech. He translated Google’s security post without adding any personal opinions. The Chinese blogpost ranked #1 when searching CNNIC MITM in Chinese on Google and Baidu. He tweeted that he received a phone call from propaganda department demanding the post to be removed immediately. The post http://www.williamlong.info/archives/4183.html was deleted. Google cache is still available.

星期三, 3月 25, 2015

Evidence shows CNNIC and CAC behind MITM attacks

Since 2013, we have repeatedly called on major software vendors to revoke CNNIC-issued certificates. Most notably, we raised this issue when we reported on the Cyberspace Administration of China’s (CAC) man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks on Google, Microsoft’s Outlook, Apple, Yahoo and Github. Mainstream media have reported about these security vulnerabilities before and on March 24, Ars Technica reported on Google’s announcement that they have definitive evidence that CNNIC (China Internet Network Information Center) was behind a new MITM attack on Google.

From our October, 2014 blog post:

星期四, 3月 19, 2015

We are under attack

We are under attack and we need help.

Likely in response to a recent story in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), we’ve experienced our first ever distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. This tactic is used to bring down web pages by flooding them with lots of requests - at the time of writing they number 2.6 billion requests per hour. Websites are not equipped to handle that kind of volume so they usually “break” and go offline.

This kind of attack is aggressive and is an exhibition of censorship by brute force. Attackers resort to tactics like this when they are left with no other options.

We are not equipped to handle a DDoS attack of this magnitude and we need help. Some background:

  • The attack started on March 17 and we are receiving up to 2.6 billion requests per hour which is about 2500 times more than normal levels.

星期四, 3月 12, 2015

Collateral Freedom and the not-so-Great Firewall

Recognizing that the authorities have been hesitant to crackdown on our method of circumvention, we have accelerated our expansion of the development of collateral freedom, in three key areas.
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There could of course be another option: your initial report was wrong.

The initial report was, indeed, 100% correct. When i lost all access to Google HK and Gmail last night, I went straight to Google UK and searched for any lastest info. This site was the only one to supply any news, and furthermore, I was amazed at how quickly such a detailed account of the situation had been provided. I have bookemarked this site; it will be extremely useful to me in my future life in China. Thanks, Greatfire Org, for quickly advising us 'just how it is', in a clear and simple way. :)

@Fons Tuinstra, Please notice that even Google ackonwledges this block, refer to its transparency report. https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/traffic/?r=CN&l=EVERYTHING&csd...

Well, Google Docs is STILL blocked in Ningbo, China, as of November 12. Incredibly annoying as I use it as a teaching tool.

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