China is the obstacle to Google’s plan to end internet censorship

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It’s been three years since Eric Schmidt proclaimed that Google would chart a course to ending online censorship within ten years. Now is a great time to check on Google’s progress, reassess the landscape, benchmark Google’s efforts against others who share the same goal, postulate on the China strategy and offer suggestions on how they might effectively move forward.

flowers on google china plaque

Flowers left outside Google China’s headquarters after its announcement it might leave the country in 2010. Photo: Wikicommons.

What has Google accomplished since November 2013?

The first thing they have accomplished is an entire rebranding of both Google (now Alphabet) and Google Ideas (now Jigsaw). Throughout this blog post, reference is made to both new and old company names.

Google has started to develop two main tools which they believe can help in the fight against censorship. Jigsaw’s DDoS protection service, Project Shield, is effectively preventing censorship-inspired DDoS attacks and recently helped to repel an attack on Brian Krebs’ blog. The service is similar to other anti-DDoS services developed by internet freedom champions and for-profit services like Cloudflare.

uProxy, Google’s circumvention tool, stumbled out of the gates and continues to make minimal impact. uProxy is a typical Google product: it has been unnecessarily overthought.

Why create an intriguing engineering solution to circumvention when much easier and effective paths already exist? Why did Google put all of their circumvention tool eggs into the basket of a very experimental idea without first doing adequate research to see whether a peer-to-peer circumvention tool could ever have a hope of singlehandedly solving the problem?

HUOoqPU.jpg (611×540)

Amusingly, as featured in a recent piece in Wired, Jigsaw has developed an automated system that is meant to protect the internet against trolls. However, it sounds surprisingly like the automated keyword mechanisms that the Chinese authorities use to censor content.

The Wired piece also mentioned that Jigsaw staff are encouraged to travel to the world’s hotspots to experience internet freedom, or lack thereof, for themselves. While this is admirable, this is not the same thing as having people on the ground and Jigsaw knows this.

Other than racking up the air miles, it is difficult to ascertain the benefits that this disaster-tourism has reaped for the team at Jigsaw or for those who live in danger on a daily basis all around the world. Furthermore, Google has plenty of staff on the ground in China – why not use them, clandestinely and securely, to help contribute to the development of uProxy?

How Google can end online censorship (redux)

We have often been critical of how foreign companies approach the China market and for good reason. Some openly admit that they adhere to the censorship demands of the Chinese authorities – Apple and LinkedIn immediately come to mind. Others try to hide their actions with words or technology. Most companies sadly bow down to the authorities and do whatever it takes to gain market access.

Google has certainly stood apart from their peers, largely because they have tried and failed on different approaches to the China market. They censored and failed and they have not censored and failed.

google china office

Interior of Google’s office in China. Photo: Keso S via Flickr.

Three years ago Eric Schmidt announced that Google would end online censorship within ten years. I wrote a story in The Guardian at that time, critical of Google’s time frame, and pointed out that they could likely achieve their goal in ten days.

But we were certainly in awe of the proclamation. We’ve waited with bated breath since then as have many other internet freedom activists. And now we are going blue in the face.

We offered suggestions to Google in 2013 on how they could defeat censorship in China. Then, as now, our opinions and suggestions are biased. We are biased because we only focus on China. We are biased because we believe that if the plan is to defeat online censorship then the focus should be on China, a country that Eric Schmidt acknowledges is “the world’s most active and enthusiastic filterer of information”.

We are biased because we have developed innovative and widely-used circumvention tools that work in China and Google pays us no heed (and even removed our app from Google Play for a short period of time). We are biased because every day we see how much appetite Chinese have for uncensored news and information.

We are biased because we have made this progress based on limited resources. We are biased because every day we dream about what we might be able to accomplish if we had the human and financial resources that Google has.

Our 2013 suggestions to Google on how they might end online censorship in China are no longer valid, largely because the Chinese authorities moved to completely block everything Google. Our premise at the time was that Google was too big for the authorities to completely block.

From 2013, the authorities set out to disrupt and block Google services in steps, finishing with the complete shutdown of Gmail in December, 2014.

It can be argued that if Google had used its unblocked web properties in 2013 to deliver uncensored content then the authorities would have moved to block everything Google sooner.

Many of the assumptions in our 2013 argument do remain valid. China still possesses the most advanced censorship infrastructure in the world. Again, as Schmidt and Cohen note in their book “The New Digital Age”:

“(China’s) unabashed and unapologetic approach to censorship would naturally appeal to states with strong authoritarian streaks, as well as states with particularly impressionable or very homogenous populations (who would fear the incursion of outside information on an emotional level).”

China is exporting its censorship technology to other states (some of which are re-exporting that technology). Thus the Chinese model of censorship is spreading globally. It makes sense to focus one’s attention on China because that is where the innovation is happening.

google china office

Interior of Google’s office in China. Photo: Keso S via Flickr.

By not focusing attention on China, Google is avoiding taking on the “world’s most censorious nation”. While Google may make gains in pushing back on the censorship efforts of other nations, China will be left unchallenged and will continue to build and refine their censorship techniques, while selling their solution to even more countries.

While Google may feel emboldened about the progress they may be making in smaller countries, with each passing day they are falling behind to China.

We also strongly believe that the sooner circumvention tools are popularised in China, the sooner we will see an end to online censorship. In China’s case, we certainly do not need to wait for 10 years (now another seven years) to bring an end to online censorship.

We simply need to promote the circumvention tools that work and make the collateral cost of blocking those tools too high for the Chinese authorities. This is our approach and, even with our limited resources, we have shown that our approach works.

With Google’s resources, this approach could be accelerated very rapidly, so that a majority of the online population in China had an easy way to circumvent. Move quick enough and the Chinese authorities will be faced with a tough decision. Block off the foreign internet, just when hundreds of millions of Chinese are using it to better themselves and their country? Or back down from censorship controls and admit defeat.

Google could acquire, support and encourage the best circumvention technology out there. The easiest way forward for Google would be to buy a solution that works. Instead they have wasted three years trying to develop their own.

There are many free circumvention tools and they all face the same problem – how to pay for operating costs? If Google could fund this in an effective way, it would be a game changer. If not, those organizations which have working circumvention tools will continue to struggle to pay the bills and scale their solutions.

Google could create an environment for the development of even better tools. For example, they could support circumvention projects that exhibit the best performance, and provide resources for those that need to improve.

Google could then incorporate working technological solutions into their mainstream products. There should be built-in circumvention in Chrome, Gmail, Google Play, etc. Making circumvention mainstream is the key and Google is, in theory, the best suited company to take it on.

Benchmarking internet freedom

Google also needs to set achievable goals for their plan to end online censorship. Somehow Google is being perceived as championing an effort to end online censorship when in fact they have made little progress in the first three years of their ten year plan to combat the efforts of the Chinese authorities.

google china office

Interior of Google’s office in China. Photo: Keso S via Flickr.

China censors more information than any other country. More people are subjected to censorship in China than any other country in the world. Since Schmidt made his announcement in 2013, censorship in China has got worse, not better. Hundreds of human rights activists and lawyers have been put into prison during this time.

Perhaps Google’s lack of progress in China is a sign of poor oversight and the failure of those who share Google’s objectives to hold them to account.

All media, human rights and internet freedom organizations and stakeholders who interact with Google, Google Ideas, Alphabet or Jigsaw should ask Google the following questions. We also invite Google to publicly provide answers to these questions:

  1. Is Google committed to ending online censorship by 2023?
  2. How is the end of online censorship defined? How will success be determined?
  3. Does this goal of ending online censorship include providing free, easy-to-use, fast and stable access to the global internet for all users in China?
  4. There are currently some 700m+ internet users in China. To end online censorship, what is a reasonable goal in terms of the number of users using circumvention?
  5. Will the plan to end online censorship include building circumvention technology into Google software, such as Chrome and the Gmail app? If not, why not?
  6. Does Google intend to develop all the technology and operate all services required to effectively end online censorship by itself, or will it acquire and/or invest in other projects? If Google intends to develop the services by itself, is Google confident that this will succeed, given the lack of results so far?
  7. Everybody is trying to create code which once deployed will cost nothing to run and will somehow make online censorship impossible. All public funding for circumvention technology is geared towards such development. The internet freedom community has spent at least ten years trying to come up with the solution. Nobody has solved it. Does Google still believe that it will be able to come up with such technology? If yes, what gives Google such confidence?

When did Google stop being angry at China?

What a difference a few years makes. In their 2013 book, The New Digital Age, Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen had no problem calling out China on multiple occasions. China is first mentioned ten pages into the book and is referenced more than any other country (and even more than Facebook and Google itself).

eric_schmidt_executive_chairman_google_left_in_conversation_with_nik_gowing_11051254154

Eric Schmidt. Photo: Wikicommons.

Readers will feel that the 2009 Chinese cyberattack on Google provided some of the impetus to write the book and some of the anger that frames it.

While they may feel that the book is outdated by this point, Schmidt and Cohen did accurately predict different scenarios (lack of respect for intellectual property, real name registration) that have played out in China.

Their stance on Chinese cyberattacks and cyber terrorism is clear:

“While China is by no means the only country engaging in cyberattacks on foreign companies, today it is the most sophisticated and prolific.”

Of course, most of the discussion of China centres on the attacks on Google infrastructure that targeted human rights dissidents in China. But their description of tactics could just as easily be applied to China’s launch of the Great Cannon in March, 2015.

Most importantly, they lay out their own case for focusing on China’s censorship regime, noting several areas of concern including:

  • Huawei exporting and boasting of its censorship-friendly technology when it struck a deal with the Iranian government
  • China’s growing influence in Africa and the willingness to trade censorship technology for access to natural resources
  • How China’s neighbours can be co-opted into playing along with censorship demands lest they be subject to state-sponsored cyber attacks or other negative forms of influence.

In what may be the most prescient thought in their book, Schmidt and Cohen discuss the manufacturers of telecoms equipment and note China’s desire to have influence over what these companies do:

Ericsson and Cisco are less controlled by their respective governments (than Huawei), but there will come a time when their commercial and national interests align and contract with China’s – say, over the abuse of their products by an authoritarian state – and they will coordinate their efforts with their governments on both diplomatic and technical levels.

Which raises the question, is this a description of how Google is dealing with China? How can a company go from criticising China so heavily, so blatantly, so angrily, to avoiding mention of the world’s “world’s most censorious nation”?

What is Google’s strategy for China?

We do not have the answers but we can posit some potential explanations:

  • Despite public perception, Google has not entirely pulled out of China. The company maintains research and development operations in China as well as employees who no doubt continue to explore possible market entry avenues for the company.

Google also continues to sell plenty of advertising to Chinese companies who wish to advertise to markets outside of China. It is possible that many of their employees in China will be threatened with prosecution or jail time if Google decides to put itself in the middle of the internet freedom movement in China.

google china office

Interior of Google’s office in China. Photo: Keso S via Flickr.

This is absolutely a real concern and there are many examples of other foreign companies who have seen their employees end up in a Chinese prison for far less. 

Google can likely continue to attract Chinese advertisers, even if they truly pull out of the market. Google must have tens of thousands of advertisers in the country. When the Chinese authorities want to put pressure on media organizations, they call advertisers and put pressure on them to pull their ads. This would be a lot harder to do in Google’s case.

  • Is Google thinking about “re-entering” the China market? Rumours of Google working with the authorities to try to bring Google Play back to the China market have been swirling since last year. Presumably Google would have to censor apps which appear in the Chinese version of Google Play and perhaps even in other markets.

Apple has paved the way here for all other companies in this regard. Thanks to the actions of Cook and Jobs before him, this would be the minimum effort that Google would have to make. China also has slightly more to lose if it allows Google Play to re-enter the market.

At present, without Google Play, Android users download apps from different, unauthorised app stores, many of which distribute apps that contain malware, in some cases developed by the Chinese authorities themselves, that can be used for surveillance and for cyber attacks.

This is the easiest and simplest explanation for Google’s actions, and has been a well worn track for scores of “moral pygmy-like” foreign companies who want to make money in China.

  • Do Googlers themselves know what is going on? Our circumvention app, FreeBrowser, sends millions of users in China to otherwise-blocked Google services. Google is the app’s default search engine. Yet the Chinese authorities were able to get FreeBrowser stuck in Play Store bureaucratic limbo for almost two weeks.

This clearly illustrates the disconnect between the publicly stated objective, which has fallen solely on Jigsaw’s shoulders, and how things are actually working day-to-day across various businesses within Google. Does the right hand not know what the left is doing?

  • Is Google facing pressure from outside forces to lay off of China? One result from the much heralded Obama/Xi cyber summit was to basically hit the pause button on cyberattacks. Is there a bigger strategy to lay off of China on other internet affairs?

Cohen has previously worked for Clinton in the State Department and much has been made of Schmidt’s relationship with the American authorities. Is there an order from up high to be less public about causing interference in China? Is there an order to do nothing that would interfere with China’s demand for cyber sovereignty? Is it Google’s idea? Is it the USG’s idea?

  • Or is the strategy to stay silent about China, but to accelerate some other, silent, covert plan to derail China’s censorship controls? Nothing that we see in the internet freedom movement in China would indicate that some secret plan is in motion. And given Joe Biden’srecent comments about Russia, it would seem that it would be hard to keep any secret plan secret anyway.

Schmidt and Cohen offer up their own thesis in their book when, after speaking with Lee Hsien Loong they decide that whatever China tries to do to prevent their citizens from accessing the internet, they will not be able to stop the overwhelming force for good that the internet, in its truest essence, ultimately is:

Events that have occurred since the publication of the book have shown that this thesis is also playing out in China. China has strengthened its control of the internet and of its people, all while the Chinese internet population recently grew to the 700m mark with 100% internet penetration achievable in the near term. Internet freedom in China still seems as distant a dream as ever.

If the Schmidt/Cohen strategy is to let internet freedom naturally unfold in China, then they should retract their claim to ending online censorship now. As China continues to export its censorship technology, and provide upgrades to existing customers, internet freedom is dying a slow death all around the world.

While Google is taking credit for being a champion of internet freedom in the world’s most dangerous places, those who are actually developing the tools that enable internet freedom are under-credited, many underfunded, and some even struggling to survive.

Google cannot profit from its reputation for standing up for ideals if they decide to do nothing to defeat censorship.

We call on Google to deliver a public update on the progress which they are making on ending online censorship everywhere in the world. There are many who are watching what Google does in the internet freedom space. Do not create false hope. If there is no realistic plan for China, then let us and others know that we should not expect anything from Google.

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星期四, 8月 10, 2023

1.4 million people used FreeBrowser to circumvent the Great Firewall of Turkmenistan

Since 2021, the authorities in Turkmenistan have taken exceptional measures to crack down on the use of circumvention tools. Citizens have been forced to swear on the Koran that they will not use a VPN. Circumvention tool websites have been systematically blocked. Arbitrary searches of mobile devices have also taken place and have even targeted school children and teachers.

The government has also blocked servers hosting VPNs which led to “near complete” internet shutdowns on several occasions in 2022. Current reports indicate that 66 hosting providers, 19 social networks and messaging platforms, and 10 leading content delivery networks (CDNs), are blocked in the country. The government presumably is unconcerned about the negative economic impact that such shutdowns can cause.

星期五, 3月 18, 2022

Well-intentioned decisions have just made it easier for Putin to control the Russian Internet

This article is in large part inspired by a recent article from Meduza (in Russian).

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Russian users have had problems accessing government websites and online banking clients. Browsers began to mark these sites as unsafe and drop the connection. The reason is the revocation of digital security certificates by foreign certificate authorities (either as a direct consequence of sanctions or as an independent, good will move); without them, browsers do not trust sites and “protect” their users from them.

However, these actions, caused - or at least triggered by - a desire to punish Russia for their gruesome actions in Ukraine, will have long-lasting consequences for Russian netizens.

Digital certificates are needed to confirm that the site the user wants to visit is not fraudulent. The certificates contain encryption keys to establish a secure connection between the site and the user. It is very easy to understand whether a page on the Internet is protected by a certificate. One need just look at the address bar of the browser. If the address begins with the https:// prefix, and there is a lock symbol next to the address, the page is protected. By clicking on this lock, you can see the status of the connection, the name of the Certification Authority (CA) that issued the certificate, and its validity period.

There are several dozen commercial and non-commercial organizations in the world that have digital root certificates, but 3/4 of all certificates are issued by only five of the largest companies. Four of them are registered in the USA and one is registered in Belgium.

星期一, 8月 03, 2020

GreatFire 应用生成器 发布

GreatFire (https://en.greatfire.org/) 是一家专注于中国的审查监督组织,我们自豪地宣布一个新的反审查工具,该工具将使任何被屏蔽的媒体、博客、人权组织或民间社会组织反制审查,将其内容得以传播到中国和其他互联网审查国家的数百万读者和支持者的手机上。

GreatFire 已经构建了一个名为“GreatFire 应用生成器”的网页程序,任何组织可以使用它来为中国和其他国家的用户解锁他们的内容。任何人可以访问 (https://appmaker.greatfire.org/),该网站将编译一个带有自己logo的应用,并将包含他们以前被封锁的内容。该应用还将包含一个特殊的、绕过审查的网络浏览器,以便用户可以访问未经审查的网络。这些应用将使用包括机器学习在内的多种策略来规避中国当局先进的审查策略。这个项目在其他有类似中国的审查限制的国家也同样有效。对于组织和最终用户而言,这些应用将免费、快速且非常易于使用。

这个项目的灵感来自于GreatFire自己的应用 自由浏览(https://freebrowser.org/en)的第一手经验,并希望帮助那些可能没有内部专业知识来规避中国审查制度的小型非政府组织。GreatFire的反审查工具在中国发挥了作用,而其他工具却没有。自由浏览可以引导中国的互联网用户从应用的首页进入被僧所内容的导航(http://manyvoices.news/)。

   

人权基金会 (HRF) 已经使用 GreatFire 应用生成器 创建了一个应用程序HRF 在全球范围内促进和保护人权。该组织的使命是确保自由在世界范围内得到维护和促进。 HRF 的网站 在中国被封锁, 但现在中国任何人都可以 下载 HRF Android 应用程序 并访问该网站的信息。

“现在是中国政府防火墙倒塌的时候了,”人权基金会战略顾问王珍妮说。 “与我们在 GreatFire 的朋友一起,我们致力于击败中国的审查制度——在每一部手机。”

GreatFire 应用生成器 的起源可以追溯到 2014 年,当时开放技术基金 (OTF) 支持 GreatFire 的“依附的自由”实验。该项目直接导致了 2015 年中国政府的大规模网络攻击,后来被称为“大炮”。 OTF 还为 GreatFire 开发 AppleCensorship.com,该网站正在跟踪苹果对包括香港在内的全球应用商店的审查情况。

自由浏览 是“大炮”攻击的直接结果,五年后,我们很高兴能够向任何可能遭受中国当局审查的组织提供我们的方法。 

星期五, 7月 24, 2020

Apple, anticompetition, and censorship

On July 20, 2020, GreatFire wrote to all 13 members of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, requesting a thorough examination into Apple’s practice of censorship of its App Store, and an investigation into how the company collaborates with the Chinese authorities to maintain its unique position as one of the few foreign tech companies operating profitably in the Chinese digital market.  

This letter was sent a week before Apple CEO TIm Cook will be called for questioning in front of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law. The CEOs of Amazon, Google and Facebook will also be questioned on July 27, as part of the Committee’s ongoing investigation into competition in the digital marketplace.

This hearing offers an opportunity to detail to the Subcommittee how Apple uses its closed operating ecosystem to not only abuse its market position but also to deprive certain users, most notably those in China, of their right to download and use apps related to privacy, secure communication, and censorship circumvention.

We hope that U.S. House representatives agree with our view that Apple should not be allowed to do elsewhere what would be considered as unacceptable in the U.S. Chinese citizens are not second class citizens. Private companies such as Apple compromise themselves and their self-proclaimed values of freedom and privacy when they collaborate with the Chinese government and its censors.

星期一, 6月 10, 2019

苹果审查中国西藏的信息

苹果在涉及西藏的审查方面有着悠久历史。 2009年,据计算机世界网透露 ,与达赖喇嘛有关的几个应用程序在苹果的中国区应用商店中不存在。这些应用的开发者未收到他们的应用被删除的通知。当面对这些审查制度时,苹果发言人只是说该公司将“继续遵守当地法律”。

2017年12月,在中国的一次会议上,当被问及与中国当局合作审查苹果应用商店时,蒂姆·库克 宣称

“所以你的选择是参与进去,还是站在局外,吼叫着事情应当怎样?我自己的看法非常强烈,你得进入赛场,因为没有任何东西会从局外发生改变。"

自苹果公司首次因与中国当局合作以遏制已被边缘化的声音而被批评的十年间,情况发生了什么变化?苹果继续严格遵守中国当局的审查令。蒂姆库克什么时候会期望他的公司能帮助在中国带来积极的变化?

根据生成的数据 https://applecensorship.com,Apple现在已经审查了在中国应用商店中29个西藏的热门应用程序。关于新闻,宗教研究,旅游甚至游戏的西藏主题应用程序正在被苹果审查。最下方附有完整的审查应用列表。

“苹果的领导力隐藏在他们审查应用程序以遵守模糊的'中国当地法律'的借口,但他们的行为缺乏任何透明度。通过从中国苹果应用商店删除藏文和其他许多应用程序,苹果阻碍了藏人获取信息和自由表达自己的能力,这是国际法下的一项基本人权。“ TibCERT(西藏计算机应急准备小组)的响应协调员Dorjee Phuntsok说道。 他们与GreatFire合作对被屏蔽的应用程序进行了分析。

   2019年1月,GreatFire推出了applecensorship.com。在那时,GreatFire联合创始人马丁约翰逊指出:“苹果公司在其透明度报告中没有分享有关应用商店审查的信息 - 该项目强制透明度。蒂姆库克可以随心所欲地说苹果在中国做了或没有做什么,但 applecensorship.com 提供了可以实际看到苹果实施审查原始数据的途径。

分析苹果在中国审查的iOS应用程序

有许多应用程序由藏人或为藏人制作,苹果正在审查中国区应用商店中的许多应用程序。了解某些应用程序被阻止的方式和原因以及这些决策背后的基本原理非常重要。为了解这一点,TibCERT(西藏应急准备小组)对在中国应用商店中被审查的藏文应用程序进行了分析。该研究使用关键字搜索藏文应用程序,然后使用GreatFire提供的应用程序审查平台。

TibCERT分析了119个以藏语为主题的iOS应用程序。使用“西藏”,“藏人”,“达赖喇嘛”,“佛教”,“藏传佛教”,等关键词搜索苹果应用商店时,可以找到下面列出的应用程序。这些应用程序分为五大类:“宗教或文化”,“媒体/政治”,“娱乐”,“工具”和“教育”。

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