中国开发者被警察要求删除软件

Since 2021, the authorities in Turkmenistan have taken exceptional measures to crack down on the use of circumvention tools. Citizens have been forced to swear on the Koran that they will not use a VPN. Circumvention tool websites have been systematically blocked. Arbitrary searches of mobile devices have also taken place and have even targeted school children and teachers.

The government has also blocked servers hosting VPNs which led to “near complete” internet shutdowns on several occasions in 2022. Current reports indicate that 66 hosting providers, 19 social networks and messaging platforms, and 10 leading content delivery networks (CDNs), are blocked in the country. The government presumably is unconcerned about the negative economic impact that such shutdowns can cause.

This article is in large part inspired by a recent article from Meduza (in Russian).

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Russian users have had problems accessing government websites and online banking clients. Browsers began to mark these sites as unsafe and drop the connection. The reason is the revocation of digital security certificates by foreign certificate authorities (either as a direct consequence of sanctions or as an independent, good will move); without them, browsers do not trust sites and “protect” their users from them.

However, these actions, caused - or at least triggered by - a desire to punish Russia for their gruesome actions in Ukraine, will have long-lasting consequences for Russian netizens.

Digital certificates are needed to confirm that the site the user wants to visit is not fraudulent. The certificates contain encryption keys to establish a secure connection between the site and the user. It is very easy to understand whether a page on the Internet is protected by a certificate. One need just look at the address bar of the browser. If the address begins with the https:// prefix, and there is a lock symbol next to the address, the page is protected. By clicking on this lock, you can see the status of the connection, the name of the Certification Authority (CA) that issued the certificate, and its validity period.

There are several dozen commercial and non-commercial organizations in the world that have digital root certificates, but 3/4 of all certificates are issued by only five of the largest companies. Four of them are registered in the USA and one is registered in Belgium.

GreatFire (https://en.greatfire.org/) 是一家专注于中国的审查监督组织，我们自豪地宣布一个新的反审查工具，该工具将使任何被屏蔽的媒体、博客、人权组织或民间社会组织反制审查，将其内容得以传播到中国和其他互联网审查国家的数百万读者和支持者的手机上。

GreatFire 已经构建了一个名为“GreatFire 应用生成器”的网页程序，任何组织可以使用它来为中国和其他国家的用户解锁他们的内容。任何人可以访问 (https://appmaker.greatfire.org/)，该网站将编译一个带有自己logo的应用，并将包含他们以前被封锁的内容。该应用还将包含一个特殊的、绕过审查的网络浏览器，以便用户可以访问未经审查的网络。这些应用将使用包括机器学习在内的多种策略来规避中国当局先进的审查策略。这个项目在其他有类似中国的审查限制的国家也同样有效。对于组织和最终用户而言，这些应用将免费、快速且非常易于使用。

这个项目的灵感来自于GreatFire自己的应用 自由浏览（https://freebrowser.org/en）的第一手经验，并希望帮助那些可能没有内部专业知识来规避中国审查制度的小型非政府组织。GreatFire的反审查工具在中国发挥了作用，而其他工具却没有。自由浏览可以引导中国的互联网用户从应用的首页进入被僧所内容的导航（http://manyvoices.news/）。

人权基金会 (HRF) 已经使用 GreatFire 应用生成器 创建了一个应用程序HRF 在全球范围内促进和保护人权。该组织的使命是确保自由在世界范围内得到维护和促进。 HRF 的网站 在中国被封锁， 但现在中国任何人都可以 下载 HRF Android 应用程序 并访问该网站的信息。

“现在是中国政府防火墙倒塌的时候了，”人权基金会战略顾问王珍妮说。 “与我们在 GreatFire 的朋友一起，我们致力于击败中国的审查制度——在每一部手机。”

GreatFire 应用生成器 的起源可以追溯到 2014 年，当时开放技术基金 (OTF) 支持 GreatFire 的“依附的自由”实验。该项目直接导致了 2015 年中国政府的大规模网络攻击，后来被称为“大炮”。 OTF 还为 GreatFire 开发 AppleCensorship.com，该网站正在跟踪苹果对包括香港在内的全球应用商店的审查情况。

自由浏览 是“大炮”攻击的直接结果，五年后，我们很高兴能够向任何可能遭受中国当局审查的组织提供我们的方法。 

On July 20, 2020, GreatFire wrote to all 13 members of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, requesting a thorough examination into Apple’s practice of censorship of its App Store, and an investigation into how the company collaborates with the Chinese authorities to maintain its unique position as one of the few foreign tech companies operating profitably in the Chinese digital market.  

This letter was sent a week before Apple CEO TIm Cook will be called for questioning in front of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law. The CEOs of Amazon, Google and Facebook will also be questioned on July 27, as part of the Committee’s ongoing investigation into competition in the digital marketplace.

This hearing offers an opportunity to detail to the Subcommittee how Apple uses its closed operating ecosystem to not only abuse its market position but also to deprive certain users, most notably those in China, of their right to download and use apps related to privacy, secure communication, and censorship circumvention.

We hope that U.S. House representatives agree with our view that Apple should not be allowed to do elsewhere what would be considered as unacceptable in the U.S. Chinese citizens are not second class citizens. Private companies such as Apple compromise themselves and their self-proclaimed values of freedom and privacy when they collaborate with the Chinese government and its censors.

苹果在涉及西藏的审查方面有着悠久历史。 2009年，据计算机世界网透露 ，与达赖喇嘛有关的几个应用程序在苹果的中国区应用商店中不存在。这些应用的开发者未收到他们的应用被删除的通知。当面对这些审查制度时，苹果发言人只是说该公司将“继续遵守当地法律”。

2017年12月，在中国的一次会议上，当被问及与中国当局合作审查苹果应用商店时，蒂姆·库克 宣称：

“所以你的选择是参与进去，还是站在局外，吼叫着事情应当怎样？我自己的看法非常强烈，你得进入赛场，因为没有任何东西会从局外发生改变。"

自苹果公司首次因与中国当局合作以遏制已被边缘化的声音而被批评的十年间，情况发生了什么变化？苹果继续严格遵守中国当局的审查令。蒂姆库克什么时候会期望他的公司能帮助在中国带来积极的变化？

根据生成的数据 https://applecensorship.com，Apple现在已经审查了在中国应用商店中29个西藏的热门应用程序。关于新闻，宗教研究，旅游甚至游戏的西藏主题应用程序正在被苹果审查。最下方附有完整的审查应用列表。

“苹果的领导力隐藏在他们审查应用程序以遵守模糊的'中国当地法律'的借口，但他们的行为缺乏任何透明度。通过从中国苹果应用商店删除藏文和其他许多应用程序，苹果阻碍了藏人获取信息和自由表达自己的能力，这是国际法下的一项基本人权。“ TibCERT（西藏计算机应急准备小组）的响应协调员Dorjee Phuntsok说道。 他们与GreatFire合作对被屏蔽的应用程序进行了分析。

   2019年1月，GreatFire推出了applecensorship.com。在那时，GreatFire联合创始人马丁约翰逊指出：“苹果公司在其透明度报告中没有分享有关应用商店审查的信息 - 该项目强制透明度。蒂姆库克可以随心所欲地说苹果在中国做了或没有做什么，但 applecensorship.com 提供了可以实际看到苹果实施审查原始数据的途径。

分析苹果在中国审查的iOS应用程序

有许多应用程序由藏人或为藏人制作，苹果正在审查中国区应用商店中的许多应用程序。了解某些应用程序被阻止的方式和原因以及这些决策背后的基本原理非常重要。为了解这一点，TibCERT（西藏应急准备小组）对在中国应用商店中被审查的藏文应用程序进行了分析。该研究使用关键字搜索藏文应用程序，然后使用GreatFire提供的应用程序审查平台。

TibCERT分析了119个以藏语为主题的iOS应用程序。使用“西藏”，“藏人”，“达赖喇嘛”，“佛教”，“藏传佛教”，等关键词搜索苹果应用商店时，可以找到下面列出的应用程序。这些应用程序分为五大类：“宗教或文化”，“媒体/政治”，“娱乐”，“工具”和“教育”。